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Abstract 
This note analyzes the impact of habit formation in media markets on the behavior of a two-sided newspaper 
platform. Using a simple dynamic approach we find that habit formation (as well as indirect network effects) lead to 
higher quantities and profits. Price setting, however, strongly depends on network as well as on habit effects. 
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1. Introduction
Media markets and especially the newspaper and magazine industry show several charac-
teristics which distinguish them from other industries and markets. Newspapers (and of
course also magazines) act as so called two-sided platforms (see Rochet & Tirole, 2003)
that connect advertisers with readers. It is broadly understood that readers exert a posi-
tive externality on the advertising market as the advertising customers’ utility increases
with the number of recipients. It is however less clear cut if readers perceive ads as useful
or disturbing and if the number of advertisers creates a positive or negative externality
for readers. However, it is clear that the two markets are interconnected and that news-
papers and magazines are at least partly able to internalize two-sided indirect network
eﬀects. Empirical evidence suggests, that newspapers tend to set copy prices just above,
at or even below marginal costs. Advertising rates on the other hand tend to be much
higher. Hence, the externalities are internalized through the price setting of the two-sided
platform.
However, in addition to indirect network eﬀects media markets frequently show also
some kind of habituated behavior. Readers of newspapers and magazines, for instance,
get used to a speciﬁc print medium (newspaper habit). TV viewers, radio listeners and
Internet users sometimes get ‘addicted’ to a speciﬁc broadcast, show or Internet service,
such as online games and social networks. Recipients then tend to consume the same
product with a higher probability in future periods or even consume the product to a
greater extend over time. In any case, habit eﬀects increase the consumers’ willingness to
pay.
Obviously, habituated behavior gives newspapers the opportunity to better plan circu-
lation numbers and adjust the content to the preferences of the (habituated) readers. But
besides this, habit eﬀects also inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ price setting behavior and has inﬂuence
on the interconnection between the two markets.
This note aims at analyzing how indirect network eﬀects and habituated behavior in-
teract and inﬂuence prices, quantities and proﬁts in the steady state. We therefore build
a simple dynamic model of a monopolistic newspaper serving a reader and an advertising
market alike. We ﬁnd that the reduction of the price on the market with the higher
relative externality can be partly lowered through the habit eﬀect. Which in turn allows
newspapers with habituated readers to raise prices above marginal costs and exploit the
behavior of the readers. As advertisers beneﬁt from the loyalty of the readers, advertis-
ing rates also increase. Newspapers facing habituated readership therefore act diﬀerently
form other two-sided markets and can extract further proﬁts, as indirect network eﬀects
are enforced and lowered at the same time. Nevertheless, quantities are always higher
with habit eﬀects.
2. Model
2. 1 Basic setup
Suppose that a monopolistic, say, regional newspaper sells content to readers and ad-
vertising space to advertisers. Suppose furthermore that both markets are interrelated
by two-sided indirect network eﬀects. Newspapers are therefore typically referred to as
two-sided platforms (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003). The inverse demand function of the
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advertising market can then be described as
rt = 1   st + gqt; (1)
where rt is the advertising rate in time t, st is the amount of advertising space and qt
is circulation in t. The parameter g > 0 indicates the indirect network eﬀect from the
reader to the advertising market. To put diﬀerently, increasing circulation also increases
the willingness to pay for advertising as the advertising rate per reader or contact (r=q)
declines with higher circulation.
In the same way inverse demand for newspapers can be described as
pt = 1   qt + qt 1 + dst; (2)
where pt is the copy price in time t. Since qt 1 is circulation in t 1 newspaper consump-
tion depends on previous consumption indicating myopic habit formation in newspaper
reading.1 Moreover,  < 1 represents the strength of the habit eﬀect.
Combining inverse demand equation, assuming an inﬁnite lifetime and assuming proﬁt








t 1[(1   qt + qt 1 + dst)qt + (1   st + gqt)st]; (3)




t 1(1   2qt + qt 1 + (d + g)st) = 0 (4)
for the reader market and

t 1(1   2st + (d + g)qt) = 0 (5)
for the advertising market.
2. 2 Steady state equilibrium
Quantities
Combining the Euler equations and assuming that all quantities are equal in the steady
state yields
q =
2 + d + g




2 + d + g   (1 + )
4   (d + g)2   2(1 + )
: (7)
1Modeling myopic habit formation by assuming that current consumption depends positively on past
consumption is the easiest way to assume habituated behavior (see Brown (1952)). Even if there are many
more elaborate ways to deal with habit eﬀects this approach is advantageous because of its simplicity,
especially in connection with the two-sidedness of the market. For examples of more elaborate models
see e.g. Becker and Murphy (1988) for a model of rational addiction or Gruber and Kszegi (2001) for a
model of rational habit formation. See also Carrol (2000) for some more literature on this issue.
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As can easily be shown, habit formation as well as indirect network eﬀects lead to in-
creasing quantities.2 In case of one-sided markets both network eﬀects equal zero and
therefore quantities reduce to ¯ q = 1
2 (1+) and ¯ s = 1
2. In case of two-sided markets
without habit formation ( = 0) q and s reduce to ˆ q = ˆ s = 1
2 d g. While the eﬀect of
the two-sidedness on advertising space is always larger than the eﬀect of habit formation
(ˆ s   ¯ s > 0) the impact on the reader market strongly depends on the parameter values
(ˆ q ¯ q R 0 , (1+) T 2 d g). Comparing circulation and advertising space yields that
the direct inﬂuence of habit formation in reader markets always leads to higher circulation
numbers.
Prices
Inserting quantities into inverse demand curves leads to optimal prices
p =
(1   g)(2 + d + g)   ((2 + d))   g




(1   d)(2 + d + g)   (1 + )
4   (d + g)2   2(1 + )
: (9)
Starting with the advertising rate (r) yields the (with respect to two-sided markets) well
known result that prices are lower when indirect network eﬀects can be exploited. First,
without any habit eﬀect the advertising rate is ˆ r = 1 d
2 d g. A higher positive network
eﬀect d that is induced by the amount of advertising lowers the advertising rate in order
to exploit this eﬀect.
Second, analyzing the advertising rate when network eﬀects are absent (d = g = 0 )
¯ r = 1
2) and comparing this price with r it follows that ¯ r R r if g R d. That is, network
eﬀects lead to a lower advertising rate if the eﬀect from the advertising to the reader
market is bigger than the opposite network eﬀect (i.e. from the reader to the advertising
market). The advertising rate increases in case that the network eﬀect d is strong (i.e.
stronger than g).
Furthermore, habit formation has a positive (negative) impact on the advertising rate
as long as d < g (d > g). To put diﬀerently, the advertising rate is higher with habit
formation (ˆ r = 1 d
2 d g < r) when the indirect network eﬀect from the advertising market
to the reader market (d) is smaller than the indirect network eﬀect from the reader to the
advertising market (g).3 The intuition behind this result is as follows: as habit formation
increases circulation and therefore also the demand for advertising space, this positive
impact can be exploited best when prices are set according to the network eﬀects. Ad-
vertising rates are therefore higher (lower) in markets with habit eﬀects when circulation
is more important for advertisers than advertising space for readers (et vice versa).
When analyzing the copy price similar results can be derived. Setting  = 0 yields
ˆ p =
1 g
2 d g. Without habit eﬀects, the copy price is higher with a low network eﬀects from
the reader to the advertising market. Setting (d = g = 0), i.e. abstaining from network
eﬀects, leads to ¯ p =
1 
2 (+1). In this case habit formation has, not surprisingly, a positive
impact on the copy price (
@ p
@ > 0).
2Note that in comparison to one-sided markets both quantities (q;s) are higher as long as the sum of
the indirect network eﬀects (d+g) is positive. As g > 0 by deﬁnition this always holds as long as jdj < g
if d < 0.
3Indeed @r
@ R 0 if g R d.
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However, when accounting for habit eﬀects and network eﬀects simultaneously results
are less straightforward. Analyzing the impact of network eﬀects on p yields that ¯ p p Q 0
if g R d
1 
1  .4 Similar as in a world without habit formation a strong network eﬀect from
the reader to the advertising market leads to a lower copy price. However, as habit
formation increases circulation (and as future proﬁts are at most as valuable as current
proﬁts) g has to be even larger than d for decreasing prices. Put diﬀerently, a strong
habit eﬀect (and also a low discount factor) and therefore higher demand for newspapers
enables the newspaper to set higher prices for copies. The eﬀect initiated by the network
eﬀect from reader to advertising markets is then damped by habit formation.5
Overall, publishers which are able to bind their readership to their newspapers and
magazine are able to attract more readers, set higher copy prices and also might set higher
advertising rates (in case that g > d). Though network eﬀects are still fully internalized,
prices would be higher.
Prots
Turning to proﬁts yields  = pq + rs or
 =
(2 + d + g)[(1   g)(2 + d + g)    ((2 + d))   g)]
(4   (d + g)2   2(1 + ))
2 (10)
+
(2 + d + g   (1 + ))((1   d)(2 + d + g)   (1 + ))
(4   (d + g)2   2(1 + ))
2 :
As can easily been shown proﬁts are always higher when readers are habituated to news-
papers. The same holds when markets are interrelated by indirect network eﬀects. The
newspaper monopolist beneﬁts from habit formation as well as from the two-sidedness of
the markets.6
3. Conclusion
Two-sided platforms which are facing habituated behavior beneﬁt from both eﬀects posi-
tively. Indirect network eﬀects reduce the price on the market which exerts the relatively
higher network eﬀect on the other market. This can lead to prices at or below the
marginal costs (see, e.g., Kaiser and Wright, 2006). Therefore, it is possible that a loss
on one market and correspondingly higher earnings on the other market can be a proﬁt
maximizing strategy. The eﬀect of habituated behavior however counteracts this price
reduction. Publishers are possibly able to increase copy prices as well as ad rates in case
that habit eﬀects are strong and readers are ‘more important’ to advertisers than vice
4More exactly, analyzing the impact of network eﬀects on p yields that ˆ p p R 0 g(1 )+d( 1) R 0.
As  < 1 it follows that ˆ p p R 0 if g(1 ) R d(1 ) or g R d
1 
1  . As  2 [0;1] 1  5 1  g has
to be bigger than d plus a mark-up determined by  and  for higher copy prices under habit formation.
5Interestingly, a relatively high  (or a low enough beta) can theoretically also overcompensate the
aggregate network eﬀect such that copy prices are higher than usual monopoly prices in spite of a large
g.
6As with  = 0 proﬁts reduce to ˆ  = 1
2 d g, the impact of the indirect network eﬀect is always











(1+) 2)3 is always positive as long as  5 1 and  < 1. Since both network eﬀects and habit
formation lead to higher proﬁts also a combination of both must lead to an increase in earnings.
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versa. However, readers as well as advertisers might suﬀer from habit eﬀects because of
higher prices.
From a competition policy perspective, it is worthwhile to identify habit eﬀects in
order to evaluate two-sided media markets. As the habituated behavior of the readership
may contradict the possible positive eﬀects that indirect network eﬀects might have on
prices, also a negative impact on consumer surplus might be eﬀected.
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